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Abstract 
 
The impact of patent protection on biomedical innovation has been a controversial issue. 
Although a “medical anti-commons” has been predicted due to a proliferation of patents on 
upstream technologies, evidence to test these concerns is only now emerging. However, most 
industrial surveys that shed light on this issue are mainly from developed countries, making it 
very difficult to predict the impact of patenting on biomedical innovation in developing and 
least developed countries. This paper develops a framework of analysis for the impact of patent 
rights on biomedical innovation in “technology follower” developing countries. Based on the 
framework developed in the paper, empirical data collected in an industry-level survey of the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry between November 2004 and January 2005 is used to analyze 
the impact of patent rights as recognized under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) on biomedical innovation in technology 
followers. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms rely on a variety of appropriability mechanisms to protect their innovations, such as 
secrecy and first mover advantages, sometimes even much more than on patents (see Cohen et 
al, 2000; Arundel, 2001). But the choice of appropriability mechanisms depends very much on 
the industry in question. Within the pharmaceutical industry, patents have always been a very 
important instrument for the protection of innovations (Mansfield, 1986; Cohen et al, 2002). 1 
Over time, stronger patent regimes, newer technologies such as biotechnology and changing 
industrial structures have contributed to an increased proliferation of patents in the biomedical 
sector.2 
 
Therefore, not surprisingly, the issue how intellectual property protection as contained in the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) 
will impact biomedical research is a controversial one, with claims in either direction. A 
medical “anti-commons” was predicted following a dramatic increase in patenting activity 
especially in the pharmaceutical and biotechnological sectors in the early 1990s (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998; Heller, 1998).3 It has been argued that present levels of intellectual property 
protection lead to too many patent rights on upstream discoveries in biomedical research and 
has the potential to stifle downstream discoveries and product development by increasing 
transaction costs and magnifying the risk of failures (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Heller, 1998; 
Eisenberg, 2001). According to scholars, this problem is worsened by patent scope issues that 
grant too broad claims to early innovators, thereby making it incumbent on subsequent 
innovators to procure licenses on research tools or earlier innovations to conduct R&D, or even 
limit them from fully capturing the gains of their innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and 
Scotchmer, 1995). These detrimental impacts of patents on access to research tools in the 
biomedical sector can be classified into three major categories: increasing the costs of available 
                                                     
1 Propensity of firms to patent differs across industries. A comparative survey that assessed the 
importance of patents in different industries showed that patents were most important for the development 
and introduction of products in two industries – the pharmaceutical and chemical industries – where they 
accounted for over 30% of development activities (Mansfield, 1998, p. 174). 
2 According to the OECD (2004, p.22), there has been a rapid rise in patent grants in 
biotechnology. In the time period 1990 to 2000, the number of patents granted in 
biotechnology rose by 15% a year at the USPTO, and by 10.5% at the EPO, compared with a 
5% increase in overall patents. 
3 An “anti-commons” is the opposite situation to a commons, where “…multiple owners are  
each endowed with the right to exclude others from using a scarce resource, and no one has an  
effective privilege of use” (Heller, 1998, p. 622). 
 services, imposing transaction costs and inconveniences on R&D and impeding the transfer of 
existing tools and technologies (WHO, 2005, p. 37). 
 
Whether intellectual property rights (hereafter, IPRs) create an anti-commons or lead to 
restricted access to research tools is a highly complex question. This not only involves 
considerations of broader patent scope and its impact on innovation, but also, effects of IPRs (as 
we have them now) on stimulating R&D, bargaining anomalies that may result from 
monopolistic positions, information issues and transaction costs (see Heller, 1998), and most 
importantly, social costs imposed by grant of such a patents regime - that is, whether there are 
research projects under this regime that were not undertaken due to IPR issues under a TRIPS-
compliant regime, and if so, do the other benefits of granting such IPRs offset these costs/ 
losses? Many of these issues have been dealt with in the literature on the topic, but mainly from 
a developed country perspective and in a framework that predominantly considers the needs and 
characteristics of biomedical innovation in developed countries. The evidence to test the 
relationship between patents and biomedical innovation, although scanty, is available only from 
select developed countries. 
 
But this topic assumes at least as much importance if not more, in technology follower 
developing countries that are trying to/have been able to develop significant local innovative 
capacity in the biomedical sector. The impacts of IPRs on hindering access to useful research 
tools in biomedical innovation may vary significantly in countries with different income levels 
and pharmaceutical industries at different stages of development. Specifically, what may look 
like a benign hindrance in the case of developed countries with significantly advanced 
biomedical sectors may in fact turn out to be a major deterrent in the case of a technology 
follower country where firms routinely experience difficulties in building technological 
capabilities in biomedical sciences. Other differences in the local systems of innovation may 
also have an impact on how IPRs on biomedical products affect innovation trends. 
 
Three main issues are of utmost importance for technology follower countries: (a) Can 
accumulated IPR positions by firms in developed countries that have a lead technological 
advantage be used to prevent serious competition from industries in developing countries in 
innovative activities at the frontier? (b) What sort of bargaining anomalies could result from 
monopolistic positions, information issues and transaction costs when one talks of licensing 
arrangements between firms across the globe? (c) How important are the restrictions placed by 
such IPRs when compared to other factors that affect firm-level decisions on taking up new 
R&D projects? 
  
This paper seeks to make a contribution towards analysing the impact of patent protection on 
biomedical innovation in developing countries in two ways – by developing a framework for 
assessing the impact of intellectual property rights on biomedical innovation in these countries, 
and by presenting evidence from the Indian pharmaceutical industry on this issue. Based on 
empirical data that was collected in 2004-2005 as part of a firm level survey of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, the paper seeks to draw robust conclusions on the impact of patents 
when compared to other factors that impede/ facilitate innovative capabilities in the biomedical 
sector. 
 
For purposes of this paper, the term “technology followers” refers to developing countries with 
newly industrializing sectors where the technological frontiers do not represent the “state-of-
the-art” technology in the field (Amsden, 2001; Forbes and Wield, 2000).4 But as against a 
static definition of “technology followers”, the definition considered in this paper is more 
dynamic and assumes that whereas the newly industrializing sector as a whole may not be 
involved in “state-of-the-art” innovation; individual firms therein are capable of offering 
competition in innovative activities at the global technological frontier. Biomedical innovation 
is defined as pharmaceutical innovation that has integrated modern biotechnological processes 
into its domain, whether for research or the development of products (Ramani, 2002, p. 381). 
Research tools are defined as “…[a]ny tangible or informational input into the process of 
discovering a drug or any other medical therapy or method of diagnosing a disease” (WHO, 
2005, p.39). In the analysis, newer R&D projects are taken as opportunities of building 
innovative capabilities. From a dynamic perspective, the more a firm is compelled to abandon 
useful R&D projects due to IPR restrictions, the larger the probability that the expansion of its 
technological capabilities are restricted. 
 
                                                     
4 The intellectual origins of the term “technology followers” can be attributed to Akamatsu’s original 
flying geese hypothesis (1961). See Amsden (2001) and Forbes and Wield (2000) for discussions and 
applications. 
 2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
In neoclassical economics, patents are a solution for the market failure caused by the non-
excludability and non-rivalrous nature of information as a good (see Arrow, 1969). 
Traditionally, the dynamic effects of patents in terms of incentives to innovate are balanced by 
the static costs in terms of limitations on competition and diffusion of information. Hence, 
design of optimal patent regimes comprises an assessment of the links between patent 
characteristics (patent length and patent scope), firm profits, and incentives to innovate (see 
Nordhaus, 1969; Scherer, 1972, among others). Simply put, one can assume that the longer the 
patent life, the greater the expected rents and the broader the patent scope, the greater the market 
power conferred on the patent holder.5 Patent breadth/ scope, on the other hand, is defined as 
“how similar other innovations can be without infringing the original patent”.6 Patent scope 
determines the strength of protection granted, and therefore also the extent of power vested in 
the patent holder to limit competition. Restricting the scope of protection has therefore been 
seen as a way of balancing the static costs of intellectual property protection as against the 
dynamic gains of encouraging innovative activity (Glasgow, 2001, p. 230).7 Similarly, diffusion 
of useful information that forms the basis of the patent is to be achieved by placing certain 
limitations on patent height (level of disclosure required in a patent application for the grant of a 
patent) within patent regimes. 
 
2.1. Motives for Patenting: A Survey of Recent Evidence 
 
Recent evidence generated by industry surveys reveals that as against the market failure 
argument postulated by neoclassical economics for grant of patents, a variety of strategic 
motives prompt the use of patents as an appropriability mechanism by firms today. These 
“strategic motives” include the use of patents as negotiating levers, as tools for prevention of 
infringement suits, blocking innovations from competitors, capturing extra value for innovative 
                                                     
5 A caveat in the case of patent length is that longer life of a patent does not always translate into higher 
expected rents, since expected rents is also determined by how long it takes for a more superior 
technology to find its way into the market (Scotchmer and Green, 1990, p. 131). 
6 cf. Gallini and Trebilcock, 1998, p. 19. 
7 Gallini and Trebilcock (1998, p. 20) note in this context that mainly due to this, economic models on 
this topic view patent scope and competition policy as perfect substitutes for one another. 
 efforts, among others. Excess market power accumulated through patents is used by firms to 
control diffusion of inventions and research results (Gallini and Trebilcock, 1998) and/or to 
cover entire areas of research or preserve market shares by accumulating ‘sleeping patents’ that 
help capture extra value for innovative efforts (Barton, 1998; Kanwar and Evenson, 2001; 
Dumont and Holmes, 2002). Not surprisingly, in a comparative survey of the manufacturing 
sectors in USA and Japan, Cohen et al (2002) found strategic uses of patents to be common in 
the manufacturing sectors in both countries, with a higher prevalence of the same in Japan 
(Cohen et al, 2002, p. 1358). The electronics industry is also a fertile example of strategic 
patenting (OECD, 2004). 
 
In biomedical innovation too, patents are used for a variety of strategic reasons. Thumm (2004) 
notes from the results of a survey of the Swiss biotechnology industry that apart from protecting 
one’s own technology from imitation, the second most prominent motive of firms to apply for a 
patent was to prevent competitors’ patenting and application activities (Thumm, 2004, p. 278). 
The survey also found that the fourth most prominent motive to patent was to improve the 
firm’s situation in R&D cooperation (ibid). Strategic use of patenting by firms are encouraged 
by patent policies that lay an emphasis on enhanced patenting activity in the biomedical sector 
and also grant increased patent scope (and encourage broader claims), thereby leading to a 
situation where there are more patents per products/ technology. This creates scope for 
proliferation of patents on upstream discoveries that can stifle newer innovations. In one of the 
first papers on this topic, Heller and Eisenberg made the point that the greater the number of 
patent holders who need to be brought into agreement for any downstream discovery to proceed, 
the greater the risk that bargaining anomalies due to transaction cost issues will prevent this 
from happening, thereby causing a “tragedy of the anti-commons” (see Heller, 1998; Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998). 
 
But up until now, concerns raised in the IPRs-biomedical innovation nexus have mainly been 
prompted by several characteristics of biomedical innovation in developed countries. 
Legislative initiatives such as the American Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 meant to encourage 
patenting in academic research have not only expanded the kinds of institutions that claim 
patent rights on biomedical innovations, but also encouraged the patenting of early-stage 
discoveries that result from publicly-funded research and are considerably removed from final 
product development (Eisenberg, 2001, p. 226).8 The emergence of biotechnology start-ups 
have blurred the boundaries between academic research and commercial entrepreneurship, and 
at the same time, expanded the limits of patenting in biomedical research even further. The 
 predominance of private research over public-funded research in biosciences is yet another 
factor that has led to a larger amount of research results being covered by proprietary claims. 9 
All these developments have led to the widespread feeling that not only firm-firm interactions 
are hindered by IPRs, but also firm-academia or even academia-academia interactions are likely 
to be held-up in biomedical research (Eisenberg, 2001, p. 230). 
 
2.2. Bargaining and Transaction Cost Issues 
 
Bargaining for patented research tools is more often than not unsuccessful due to transaction 
costs that result from institutional heterogeneity, conflicting agendas of different agents, 
difficulties in valuation and increased litigation in public research organizations (Eisenberg, 
2001; OECD, 2002).10 Biomedical innovation is characterized by the flow of ideas, skills and 
research tools between universities, research institutes and the private sector and these 
institutions may be heterogenous in terms of business demands, practices and work ethics that 
hinder meaningful cooperation. Information asymmetries on the value of patented tools as 
research inputs cause difficulties in evaluation and lead to undue expectation of rents from the 
transaction (see for example, Merges, 1994). More generally, research tool users feel that the 
provider is asking for too much in return for access to a patented product based on an over-
valuation of the contribution of the tool relative to other inputs for future valuable discoveries. 
Such factors create situations that do not necessarily foster meaningful exchange. As Cohen at 
al (2000) appropriately note: “Patents become weapons in mutually reinforcing, non-
cooperative strategic interactions where firms feel increasingly compelled to patent either 
because they need to protect themselves from suits or from being blocked, or they want to block 
rivals or use patents as bargaining chips in negotiations.” 
 
Apart from bargaining and transaction cost issues, patents on research tools can also create 
commercialization hurdles (OECD, 2002). Patent thickets and royalty stacking discourage 
subsequent innovators - the larger number of licenses that have clauses on royalty sharing on the 
final product, the lesser the revenue for the inventor.11 
                                                                                                                                                           
8 See Rai (1999) and So et al (2005) in this context. 
9 Eisenberg (2001, p. 227) notes that in the 1990s, despite heavy investment by the US  
government, private research expenditure in biomedical sciences was much more than public  
funded research. 
10 Eisenberg summarises these as the main issues that were significant during the  
investigation of the Working Group on Research Tools, National Institute of Health, USA,  
1998, which investigated difficulties encountered by researchers in orbationing access to  
propreitary research tools in biomedical research. 
11  Royalty stacking refers to a situation where each earlier innovator grants access to his/her  
  
Major cases where patents have blocked subsequent innovation and attracted public attention 
have up until now not been from the biomedical sector.12 But is the lack of a “block buster” case 
pointing out to the absence of such behaviour in the biomedical sector? Up until now, limited 
evidence that tests these concerns is available from USA, Switzerland and Germany. Walsh et al 
(2003) conducted a survey of the biomedical sector in the USA, an interview method 
supplemented mainly by archival data, which tried to test whether an “anti-commons” can really 
be observed in the USA, and whether patent rights in the biomedical sector hinder innovation.13 
The study concludes that although problems of transaction costs, restricted access to research 
tools and royalty stacking exist, there is no real “anti-commons” in biomedical research since 
parties are able to deal with these issues and “…IP on research tools, although sometimes 
impeding marginal projects, rarely precludes the pursuit of more promising ones”. The study 
underscores the importance of working solutions - like infringement, research exemptions, 
inventing around and invalidating patents in courts – in reducing the risks associated with the 
creation of an “anti-commons” due to intellectual property protection on research tools. A 
German survey conducted on the issue (Straus et al, 2004) also uses a similar interview 
method.14 This survey concluded that although royalty stacking is a real problem, research 
agreements are not usually hampered by the presence of intellectual property in the German 
biopharmaceutical sector, and working solutions and court resolution of disputes are common 
(Straus et al, 2004). Another common conclusion in both these studies was that firms in both 
countries admitted to avoiding taking on research projects where there are too many patents on 
research tools (OECD, 2002, p. 51). 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
product in return for a royalty on the new innovation. The greater number of earlier patents that  
need to be licensed to proceed with innovation, the larger the number of royalty agreements that  
get “stacked” on to the yet-to-be-discovered product. 
12 See for example the case of the digital video compression standard MPEG 2, where patent  
pools have been successful in solving problems of patent thickets and ‘stacking’ licenses, or the case of 
“golden rice” in agricultural biotechnology. 
13 The sample is a mix of universities and firms. 70 interviews were conducted with IP  
attorneys, business managers and scientists from 10 pharmaceutical firms, 15 biotechnology  
firms as well as university researchers and technology transfer officers from 6 universities and  
finally, patent lawyers, government and trade association personnel. 
14 The sample size was 25, and consisted of four large pharmaceutical companies, nine small  
and medium-sized specialized biotechnology companies, seven public research institutes and  
five genetic research testing centres. 
 2.3. Assessing the Impact of Intellectual Property on Biomedical Innovation in 
Developing Countries: The Overwhelming Considerations 
 
I suggest a framework that analyses the impact of intellectual property on biomedical innovation 
in technology follower developing countries. This framework primarily considers four main 
issues, and requires that an analysis on the impact of IPRs on biomedical innovation be 
necessarily conducted from an ex-ante decision-making perspective. 
 
Can accumulated IPR positions by firms in developed countries that have a lead technological 
advantage be used to prevent serious competition from industries in technology follower 
countries in innovative activities at the frontier? The implications of patents on research tools 
may be much more drastic in technology follower countries: in addition to imposing transaction 
costs on research (of the kinds that can be resolved through “working solutions” of various 
kinds), they can completely impede the transfer of existing tools and technologies completely 
(WHO, 2005). Such an impediment to the transfer of existing tools and technologies to 
technology follower countries can prevent the development of innovative capabilities including 
knowledge-bases in the biomedical sector (CIPR, 2002). This problem is in many ways 
synonymous to the access to medicines problem that Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is seeking to resolve (WHO, 2005, p. 42). Only, the 
impact of this issue is being felt only recently and may take sometime until it mobilizes 
attention.  
 
The second issue for technology follower countries relates to the kinds of bargaining anomalies 
that could result from monopolistic positions, information issues and transaction costs when one 
talks of licensing arrangements between firms/ research institutes and universities across the 
globe? Specifically, are institutions in developing countries in a position to conclude such 
arrangements? What are the transaction costs faced by firms in developing countries where 
“working solutions” such as infringements and invalidating patents in courts is not common?15 
How are these affected when firms on both sides do not have IP assets to trade that interest them 
mutually, in quid pro quo relationships? 
 
Thirdly, what are the social costs of such an IPRs regime? Will a project be undertaken ex-ante 
even under the present IPRs regime? If patenting is excessive under this regime, then are the 
                                                     
15 In India, as the discussion in the next section of the paper shows, one could suppose that the research 
exemption applies for commercial research as well and this is a good working solution, but there seems to 
be a need for clarification on this, either through a legislative amendment or a court ruling on the topic. 
 social costs of offset by the diffusion of information through patents or through reduced 
incentives to litigate (Cohen et al, 2002)? How would negotiation proceed without intellectual 
property protection and how does IPR protection change bargaining thresholds of parties? That 
is, do we have more or less the same number of projects under alternate IPR regimes, all other 
things being constant? If not, how important are IPRs restrictions, when compared to other 
factors that affect firm-level decisions on taking up new R&D projects?  
 
Another more general but important set of issues are raised by the nuanced relationship between 
patent policies and institutions, and the diffusion of knowledge and competition in different 
environments (Granstrand, 2000). Not only is it widely acknowledged now that the impact of 
patents on diffusion of information, inhibiting competition and promoting innovation is sector 
and context-specific but also that habits and practices of actors in a system of innovation can 
hinder/ help leverage these effects.16 
 
Several observations made in the American and German surveys support the need for such a 
framework for technology follower countries that looks deeper into these questions. The US 
survey itself, in several places, infers that the problems of royalty stacking, costs and delays in 
licensing due to IP protection and upstream discover patents may be much more acute and even 
prohibitive for smaller firms with limited budgets, it is very likely that firms in other countries, 
especially developing countries, are more affected (see Walsh et al, 2003). The authors also 
conclude that the problem of intellectual property holders being able to limit access to upstream 
discoveries and promising research targets was generally considered to be manageable because 
if research tool was critical, the interviewed firms would buy access to it (p. 322-323). Even if 
one would accept this observation, the extent to which this will hold for firms/ research 
institutes in technology follower developing countries will depend on their ability to “buy” 
access to important research tools. The emphasis on “working solutions” to deal with these 
problems in the American and German surveys also calls for a more rigorous assessment of this 
issue on a larger scale, once again with a special emphasis on technology follower countries. 
Specifically, what will happen when a particular national legal regime does not provide for the 
same or similar “working solutions” to be negotiated between parties in an efficient way? A 
final point that stands out is – what will be the implications for building innovative capabilities 
                                                     
16 Cohen et al (2002) found in a comparison of R&D labs in the manufacturing sectors between Japan and 
USA that appropriability conditions depend on cross-national differences in policy and institutional 
environments. Hence, patents played a larger role in diffusion of information across rivals in the Japanese 
industry than in the USA and this was found to be due to their respective patent systems (Cohen et al, 
2002). 
 in firms in technology follower countries cannot pursue research projects in areas where there 
are already too many patents on research tools? 
 3.   BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION IN INDIA: THE CASE OF A TECHNOLOGY 
FOLLOWER 
 
India is often cited as a prime example of an “innovative developing country” (Morel et al, 
2005, p. 2; Mashelkar, 2005).17 The Indian pharmaceutical industry is a good case to analyse the 
impact of stronger patent rights on biomedical innovation due to several reasons. India has a 
thriving pharmaceutical industry with an increasingly expanding biotechnological sector, and is 
presently transitioning from a weaker IPR regime that promoted incremental and imitative 
innovation to a TRIPS compliant IPR regime.18 With the full-scale implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement and associated questions of access to medicines, biomedical innovation in 
India has attracted much attention as an example of success by scholars and donor agencies 
aiming at building local capacities in other developing countries. 
 
The remaining sections of this paper use empirical data to test the impact of patents on 
biomedical innovation in India. To answer the question: will a project be undertaken ex-ante 
even under the present IPRs regime? This paper considers the earlier Indian IPR regime as a 
weaker alternative to the one presently prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement, in order to assess 
the impact of the TRIPS-compliant IPRs regime on choices of firms to pursue specific R&D 
portfolios, and its resulting impact on building innovative capabilities in biomedical sciences. 
 
                                                     
17 These authors define the term “innovative developing countries” as developing countries 
that have demonstrated a significant promise in carrying out activities in health innovation. 
18 A variety of reasons promoted the Indian pharmaceutical sector in the last fifty years, main  
ones being: the presence of a weak patent regime, the initiation of government-held  
pharmaceutical companies for local production, price control of drugs and other sectoral factors,  
such as the lack of data protection. For a detailed discussion, see Gehl Sampath (2005). 
 3.1. Innovation in Indian Pharma Biotech and the Impact of Patent Compliance 
 
The Indian pharmaceutical industry is amongst one of the largest industries within developing 
countries and accounted for 8% of the global output in terms of the volume and ranked 13th in 
terms of value in 2004 (IBEF and Ernst and Young, 2004, p. 8). On the domestic front, the sale 
of retail formulations in the domestic market reached an estimated US$ 4.3 billion in the fiscal 
year 2003, and was dominated by Indian companies which held a market share of 75% (IBEF 
and Ernst and Young, 2004, p 8). Its major strengths include: a cost-competitive manufacturing 
base that extends to clinical studies, extensive skills in chemistry and process development, 
ability to manufacture over 50% of the bulk drugs needed for its pharmaceutical production 
activities locally, the emergence of a promising biotechnology industry, availability of local 
scientists and R&D personnel of a high scientific quality and a wide network of R&D (CII, 
1999; IBEF and Ernst and Young, 2004, p. 2; Grace, 2004, p. 18).  
 
Indian compliance with the TRIPS Agreement has proceeded in several stages up until now. 
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 introduced the mail box system and set up a system of 
exclusive market rights (hereafter, EMRs) to be retrospective from 01 January 1995 in 
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. The Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002 introduced 64 
changes to the Patent Act of 1970, the most important ones of these being the extension of 
patent term from 14 to 20 years, and the reversal of burden of proof from patent holder to 
alleged infringer (see People’s Commission, 2003). The final set of changes to make India’s 
patent regime comply with the TRIPS Agreement in toto were first contained in the Indian 
Patent Ordinance of 2004, that has now been replaced by the Indian Patent (Amendments) Act 
of 2005. The Indian Patent (Amendments) Act, 2005 seeks to complete India’s full-scale 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. The Act has the effect of invalidating Section 5 of the 
Indian Patent Act, which granted only process patents for food, medicines and other drug 
substances, in order to make product patent protection of pharmaceuticals possible under Indian 
law. As a result, reverse engineering possibilities available to the pharmaceutical industry will 
only be limited to those drugs that are off-patent. 
 
Section 47 of the original Patents Act of 1970 contains a research exemption for patented 
inventions (see Section 47 (3)). This section, which can be interpreted as applicable for both 
academic and commercial research, has been left unmodified by all subsequent amendments to 
the patent regime. But two major changes introduced in the Amendments of 2002 affect the 
patenting of research tools for biomedical and biotechnological inventions in India. The Patent 
 Act has extended the scope of patentable inventions to a method or process of testing during the 
process of manufacture, including those in biochemical, biotechnological and microbiological 
areas.19 Section 3 of the Patent Act that deals with inventions that are not patentable was 
amended in 2002 to include any process for the diagnostic or therapeutic treatment of human 
beings or for a similar treatment of animals or plants (See Section 3(i)). 
 
As a result of these provisions, biomedical research tools are patentable under Indian patent law. 
There are two exceptions to this. Firstly, there is a research exemption for patented inventions 
(Section 47 (3) of the original Act), which can be interpreted to be applicable for both academic 
and commercial research. Secondly, medical, diagnostic and therapeutic kits/ tools are not 
patentable only when they are for the treatment of human beings or animals or plants. 
 
3.2 Methodology and Variables 
 
The data used for the analysis was collected in an industry survey of 103 pharmaceutical firms 
in India between October 2004 and January 2005, complemented with insights from case study 
interviews conducted to supplement information gathered in the survey. One major result 
achieved using the country-level data was the classification of Indian pharmaceutical companies 
into three main categories, based on both their structural characteristics and emerging R&D and 
business strategies. In order to achieve this, several databases of the Indian pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological industry were considered, such as the India Infoline and Pharmabiz. Using a 
background report on the state of the industry that was prepared to aid the survey and the 
databases, firms were ranked on the basis of their export potential, ability to invest in R&D 
activities and annual turnover, since these factors determine their ability to invest into R&D, 
devise marketing and R&D strategies and access other markets. The first group of firms 
(hereafter, group 1) comprises large-scale pharmaceutical firms that are both subsidiaries of 
MNCs in India or wholly-owned Indian firms. The second group of firms (hereafter, group 2) 
comprises pure generic manufacturers whose ability to do product development is very limited. 
These companies supply predominantly to the Indian market as well as to other semi-regulated 
and unregulated markets. The third and final group of companies (hereafter, group 3) are those 
that mainly perform contract research and manufacturing (CRAM) for bigger Indian companies, 
both local and MNCs.20 
 
                                                     
19 See “Salient Fratures of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 and the Patent Rules, 2003”, 
downloadable from: www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/salient_f.htm 
 The 103 firms that participated in the country-level empirical survey were chosen through a 
purposive probability sampling technique.21 Of these 31 belonged to Group 1, 27 to Group 2 and 
44 to Group 3. Data was collected for a time period of 2000 to 2004, in order to be able to 
assess emerging constraints, firm strategies and the impact of patenting over time. In addition to 
interviewing a cross-section of firms that participated in the survey, several other firms that 
were not part of the questionnaire survey were also interviewed during field work especially in 
the biotechnology sector to understand their main concerns and experiences on patent issues. A 
range of organisations within the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry in India were 
consulted for the field work and also as sources of primary information. These included the 
Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (FICCI), the Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI), the Indian 
Drug Manufacturers Association (IDMA) and the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA). The 
key informants consulted during field work were the Heads of Marketing and the Heads of 
R&D in each firm. Wherever the firms had their own intellectual property divisions, the heads 
of the intellectual property division were also interviewed. 
 
Apart from primary data, a variety of other data sources were employed, including secondary 
sources and case studies that rely considerably on scientific expertise perception of scientists. 
Secondary research consisted of a detailed review of existing literature including general 
documents on access to medicines and international developments related to the TRIPS 
Agreement and policy documents and papers on the impact of product patent protection on the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry. 
 
The survey focused on several aspects of access to technologies for biomedical innovation in 
India. Amongst these, it addressed the question whether access to new technologies has become 
more difficult for firms since India began its phased out compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
in 2002. Firms were asked to rank reasons for the increasing difficulties to access new 
technologies. Firms were also asked whether they have abandoned R&D projects due to IPR 
restrictions; and those that abandoned R&D projects were asked to provide details. In the 
analysis, newer R&D projects represent opportunities for building innovative capabilities in the 
                                                                                                                                                           
20 See Gehl Sampath (2005); also see Sridharan (2005). 
 
21 Simply put, the purposive probability sampling (PPS) technique refers to a method of  
choosing firms in such a way that the key representatives of the industry are taken into account  
in the survey completely (purposive) and the rest of the population is chosen at random. In this  
survey, since group 1 firms are key representatives of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, the  
effort has been to cover them to the fullest extent possible. Firms from groups 2 and 3 have been  
chosen at random from the ranking list created for the study based on export potential, total  
sales and R&D investments. 
 biomedical sector. Therefore, from a dynamic perspective, the larger number of useful R&D 
projects a firm has to abandon due to IPR restrictions, the larger the probability that the 
expansion of its technological capabilities is restricted. 
 
3.3. The Model 
 
As a result of the binary nature of the problem analysed, logit technique has been used in the 
analysis to estimate the impact (both positive and negative) of various variables on the 
likelihood that a firm will abandon R&D due to intellectual property restrictions. 
The logit model can be specified as follows: 
i
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Where P = the probability that a firm abandons R&D due to IPR restrictions on products/ 
processes required for its innovation activities. Xi’s represents the independent variables. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Abanrd  = 1 if a firm had abandoned R&D  
    = 0 otherwise (if a firm did not abandon R&D) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Hiringmsk = 1 if a firm rates hiring managers and skilled personnel as 
a strong source of new technology 
   = 0 otherwise  
 
Total sales   =  the natural logarithm of firm’s total sales  
 
Firm size   =  the natural logarithm of firm’s total employment  
 
Joint R&D  = 1 if a firm rates joint venture R&D as a   
  strong source of new technology 
   = 0 otherwise 
  
Restricted access   = 1 if a firm’s has high restricted access to upstream  
     technology due to IPRs    
   = 0 otherwise 
 
The model was estimated using stepwise maximum likelihood procedure. Thirteen variables 
were considered important to examine determinants of abandoning R&D in the Indian industry. 
This included factors that could hinder biomedical innovation, such as restricted access, royalty 
stacking, high licensing fees, financial constraints and too many patents on upstream 
technologies were taken. The other variables were those that could potentially improve access to 
tools for biomedical innovation – joint R&D, technology licensing, export orientation of firms, 
R&D expenditure of firms, improved sales, improved employment, foreign investment and 
hiring of skilled personnel. 
 
The results obtained are presented in Table 3 but only for the variables that were retained by the 
stepwise procedure adopted. However, comments have been made thereafter where necessary 
for the variables rejected by this method. In order to be able to predict what the relative impact 
of each one of these variables is on a firm’s likelihood to abandon R&D, the marginal effects of 
each one of the variables have been computed in Table 5. 
 
 4. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive analysis was conducted on a range of issues using the data collected, in order to 
corroborate and shed more light on the results of the model. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
 
Will India’s full-scale TRIPS compliance result in restricted access to technologies to the local 
pharmaceutical industry? To test this proposition, the survey posed the question whether firms 
face increased difficulties in accessing new technologies that are required for their activities 
after India started its phased compliance with the TRIPS Agreement over the past few years. A 
total of 43 firms felt that access to new technologies have become more difficult after India 
started implementing its compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. Of these, 12 belonged to group 
1, 11 belonged to group 2 and 20 to group 3. But of the 43 firms that did face difficulties in 
accessing new technologies after India began complying with the TRIPS Agreement, only 28 
firms admitted to having abandoned R&D projects due to patent protection. Of these, 11 
belonged to group 1, 7 to group 2 and 10 to group 3 (see Table 1). Interviews with firm 
executives revealed that projects were abandoned mainly because (a) firms faced difficulties in 
terms of high costs for licensing and (b) firms realized ex-post that the results of their R&D 
would infringe patents filed for by competitors on the same compounds/ processes (interviews). 
Table 1: Impact of TRIPS agreement on access to technologies 
Firm group/Issue More difficult access to 
technologies because of TRIPS 
Abandoned R&D projects due to 
IPR restrictions 
1 12 11 
2 11 7 
3 20 10 
Total N = 43 N=28 
Source: WHO-INTECH survey conducted by author, 2005 
 
The survey also asked the firms to identify factors responsible for difficulties in accessing new 
technologies. The respondents were asked to rank each one of the reasons contained in Table 2 
from 1 (weakest) to 5 (strongest). As Table 2 shows, all reasons ranked from significant to very 
significant (above 2.5), with royalty stacking being a reason that is relatively less important than 
multiple patents, restricted access due to contractual difficulties and high licensing fees. 
 Furthermore, the survey response to this question also shows that group 2 firms are much more 
sensitive to the increasing number of patents, restricted access and the high licensing fees 
involved in carrying out incremental innovations as a result of India’s TRIPS compliance. 
 
Table 2: Reasons for difficulties in accessing new technologies after India’s TRIPS 
compliance 
Firm group/Effect Too many patents 
on research inputs 
needed for R&D 
Restricted access 
due to contractual 
difficulties 
Royalty stacking 
in licensing 
contracts 
High licensing 
fees 
1 3.17 (12) 3.33 (12) 2.33 (12) 3.33 (12) 
2 3.91 (11) 3.64 (11) 2.55 (11) 3.91 (11) 
3 3.35 (20) 3.55 (20) 2.79 (19) 3.58 (19) 
Average mean/ 
Firm total 
3.44 (43) 3.51 (43) 2.60 (42) 3.60 (42) 
Source: WHO-INTECH field survey conducted by author, 2005 
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
 
The results of the logit model are shown in Table 3 below. The overall goodness of fit statistics 
– Log likelihood, Likelihood ratio LR-Test and Pseudo R2 indicate a relatively well fitted 
model. There were no problems of multicolinearity or heteroscedasticity. The model retained 
five of the thirteen variables originally chosen for the logit analysis. 
Table 3: Logit Analysis with Abandon R&D as the Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables Coefficients Std. Err. P-Values 
Hiringmsk -0.589 0.359 0.101 
Total sales 1.361 0.544 0.012 
Firm size -1.526 0.652 0.019 
JointR&D 0.746 0.393 0.058 
Restricted access 1.975 0.717 0.005 
Constant 1.414 2.656 0.594 
No of Observations 72   
LR–Test 22.57 
(0.0004) 
  
Log Likelihood -29.20   
Pseudo R2  0.2788   
Source: Computed from WHO/ UNU-INTECH Survey conducted by author, 2005. 
 
The interpretation of the variables retained in Table 3 is as follows. Three of the variables had a 
positive probability/influence on abandoning R&D in the Indian pharmaceutical industry (Total 
sales, Joint R&D and Restricted access) – in other words the probability to abandon R&D 
 increases with higher sales, need to conduct joint R&D and with restricted access to upstream 
technology due to contractual hurdles. 
 
Total sales was significant at 5 % while joint R&D was significant at 10 % and Restricted 
access was significant at 1 %. That joint R&D or prospects thereof leads firms to abandon R&D 
is also confirmed by data collected by the survey on local collaborations. Indian firms 
demonstrate a lack of collaborative links with other firms, universities and research institutes, 
although this is normally high in other countries that have shown significant success in 
biomedical innovation. Out of the 103 firms surveyed, only 31 firms admitted to having local 
collaborators whereas 72 firms had no local collaborations of any form. But those firms which 
collaborate have very strong collaborative linkages with other institutions, both local and 
foreign. These results are shown in Table 4 which contains the average ranking of intensity of 
local and foreign collaborations by the firms (where 1 = weakest and 5= strongest). 
Table 4: Collaborative links: local and foreign  
Links/Firm Group Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total 
Local 4.07(14) 3.86(7) 3.70(10) 3.90(31) 
Foreign 3.69(13) 3.38(8) 2.89(9) 3.37(30) 
Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to the number of firms 
Source: WHO-INTECH Survey conducted by author, 2005 
 
Also notably, amongst the firms that admitted to having collaborations, most were in the area of 
research as opposed to product development. The reason for this seems to lie in the way firms 
are used to competing in the Indian industry historically – prior to patent protection, all products 
were mostly generic copies and firms thrived mainly on brand name competition to sell their 
products. Therefore, although there are clearly greater gains to collaborating in product 
development in the newer research-intensive environment, habits and practices of industry 
actors seem to pose major hurdles. This seems to be gradually undergoing a transition, and the 
only area of product development with a greater degree of collaboration is health biotechnology, 
but mainly between large pharma and smaller biotechnological start-ups. 
 
The result on Restricted access is also supported by descriptive data gathered in the survey, 
contained in Table 2. Firms repeatedly iterated the problems of contractual difficulties that 
pointed to transaction cost issues that arise especially in transnational contexts (Indian firms 
need to license research tools from foreign firms). In addition to the problems posed by the 
transnational nature of the transaction, this also points attention to another potential issue: such 
license transactions may be failing because although they are important for the Indian firm, they 
 may be only of marginal importance to the foreign counterpart who holds the patent.22 Firm 
executives also confirmed abandoning research projects where there were too many existing 
patents, a finding which is in line with both the US and German surveys. At the same time, 
executives also admitted to the difficulties in branching out to specific areas of research due to 
the problems in obtaining licenses or too many existing patents that discourage R&D plans, thus 
clearing pointing out to the issues for expanding innovative capabilities and knowledge bases in 
technology follower countries. 
 
Hiringmsk and Firm size both had a negative probability implying that the probability to 
abandon R&D decreased with greater skilled personnel and bigger firm size. Firm size was 
significant at 5 % while Hiringmsk was (near) significant at 10 %. Two-thirds of R&D spend is 
on active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) and formulation work, whilst only one-third is on 
new chemical entity research, and of that, 80% is prior art or analogue research (Grace, 2005, 
p.9) – this explains the negative correlation between firm size and a firm’s probability to 
abandon R&D to a large extent. 
 
Table 5 below presents the results of marginal effects on abandoning R&D. The coefficients 
represent the mean values of marginal effects. Note that all the variables remained significant. 
Total sales and Restricted access were significant at 1 %. Therefore, if a firm increased its total 
sales by one unit, it was likely to increase its chance of abandoning R&D by 0.182 points. 
JointR&D was positive and significant at 5% - when a firm increased the possibility of 
conducting joint R&D for newer source of technology, it was more likely to abandon R&D than 
consider joint R&D as a source of newer technology. Similarly if a firm increased its chances of 
high restricted access to technology by one unit, it was likely to increase its chance of 
abandoning R&D by 0.320 points. Or, if a firm moved from high restricted access to technology 
to low restricted access technology, it was likely to reduce its chances of abandoning R&D by 
0.32 points. Similarly, when a firm increased its intake of skilled personnel who could be the 
source of new technologies by one unit, it was likely to reduce its chance of abandoning R&D 
by 0.079 units (Hiringmsk is negative and significant at 10%). Firm size which was negative 
and significant at 1 % can be explained in the same manner. 
 
                                                     
22 Walsh et al (2003) note in their survey that whereas IPRs impacted negatively on the pursuit  
of marginal projects, they hardly ever hinder the more important projects. Yet, economic theory  
dictates that as long as there are projects at the margin that are being hindered, there will be  
welfare losses associated with such a regime.  
 Table 5: Marginal Effects on a Firm’s Likelihood of Abandoning R&D due to IPR 
Restrictions  
Independent Variables Coefficients Std. Err. P-Values 
Hiringmsk -0.079 0.048 0.101 
Ltsales 0.182 0.066 0.006 
Lempt -0.204 0.080 0.011 
Jointrd 0.100 0.051 0.052 
Restaccess 0.320 0.120 0.008 
Source: Computed from UNU-INTECH Survey conducted by author, 2005 
 
 5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is clearly a need to develop more comprehensive frameworks as well as collect more 
systematic data to assess the impact of patents on biomedical innovation in technology follower 
countries. This paper has shown that four sets of issues are very important in such a framework 
from a technology follower developing country perspective: Can accumulated IPR positions 
result in impeding access to research tools for firms in technology follower countries? What are 
the kinds of bargaining anomalies that could result from monopolistic positions, information 
issues and transaction costs when one talks of licensing arrangements between firms/ research 
institutes and universities across the globe? Do we have more or less the same number of 
projects under alternate intellectual property rights regimes (that is, TRIPS compliant regime 
versus a different one)? And, how do patent policies and institutions affect knowledge flows, 
diffusion of innovation and habits and practices of actors in a system of innovation? 
 
To assess whether we have more or less the same number of projects under alternate intellectual 
property rights regimes (that is, TRIPS compliant regime versus a different one), this paper 
considers the earlier Indian IPR regime as a weaker alternative to the one presently prescribed 
by the TRIPS Agreement, in order to assess the impact of the TRIPS-compliant IPRs regime on 
choices of firms to pursue specific R&D portfolios, and the resulting impact on building 
innovative capabilities in biomedical sciences. All other things being constant, the Indian case 
analysed in this paper seems to show that patent protection in the biomedical sector has a 
negative impact on the number of projects pursued under a TRIPS compliant regime. Newer 
R&D projects represent opportunities for building innovative capabilities in the biomedical 
sector. From a dynamic perspective, the larger number of useful R&D projects a firm has to 
abandon due to IPR restrictions, the larger the probability that the expansion of its technological 
capabilities is restricted. This requires a more detailed look and a more rigorous analysis in the 
coming years, as and when more information on the Indian industry becomes available. 
 
The model developed in the paper using empirical data from the Indian pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology sector shows that amongst the five determinants of a firm’s probability to 
abandon useful R&D projects, restricted access to upstream technology due to contractual 
difficulties is a factor that is highly significant (at 1%).  The marginal effects of each one of 
these variables has been calculated in the analysis, in order to see how likely each variable is to 
 influence a firm’s probability of abandoning R&D, and how important IPR restrictions are, 
when compared to other factors that affect the building of innovative capabilities in technology 
follower developing countries. This analysis reveals that whereas all variables remained 
significant, restricted access to upstream technologies due to contractual difficulties was the 
variable with that is likely to have maximum impact on a firm’s decision to abandon R&D 
projects. If a firm increased its chances of high restricted access to technology by one unit, it 
was likely to increase its chance of abandoning R&D by 0.320 points – this was much more 
than the computed effect of other variables that affected a firm’s likelihood of abandoning R&D 
projects in the Indian industry. 
 
A good analysis of the issues raised by patents on research tools in biomedical innovation will 
require firm-level surveys that gather empirical data on the impact of TRIPS-compliant patent 
regimes and analyse the implications from an ex-ante decision-making perspective.23 To study 
this problem and its impact systematically in developed as well as technology follower 
developing countries, more unified research methodologies may be required. When existing 
evidence from USA, Germany and Switzerland, and now, India, on the issue are consulted, the 
impact of IPRs on biomedical innovation seems to be divergent. It appears that differences in 
research methodologies are the main reason for contrasting empirical evidence on this issue 
until now. The American and German surveys are characterized by methodological constraints 
that do not allow for a detailed assessment of the tradeoffs and impacts in stronger patent 
protection on biomedical innovation.24 At the same time, several of the results obtained from the 
Indian survey and presented in this paper are very similar to the Swiss survey of the 
biotechnology industry, which was also a firm level investigation.  
 
The same/ similar sets of patent policies and institutions can have different impacts on 
knowledge flows, diffusion of innovation and habits and practices of actors in different systems 
of innovation. These inter-linkages need to be assessed in country-specific contexts. Taking the 
TRIPS level of intellectual property protection for granted, technology follower countries 
should look at reducing the problem of restricted access through appropriate design of patent 
regimes. Analysis of these inter-linkages should take into account the nuanced relationship 
                                                     
23 Since several developing countries have only recently complied with the TRIPS Agreement  
(and several LDCs are yet to comply due to the extension granted to them under the Doha Agreement on 
the TRIPS Declaration and Public Health until 2016), data that compares a pre-TRIPS scenario to a post 
TRIPS one will be very useful. 
24 It is debatable whether the sample considered in the US and German surveys is  
representative enough – the American sample is a mix of universities and firms, whereas the  
German survey consisted of 25 institutions in total both from the private and public sector.  
Furthermore, both surveys are descriptive; descriptive surveys  usually need to be corroborated  
by firm-level evidence. 
 between patent policies on creating widespread technological interdependence in the biomedical 
sector. Such technological interdependence does not necessarily have to be the result of policies 
that dictate broad patent scope. Even in regimes where patent policy dictates that patents are 
granted only on fewer claims and the claims themselves are interpreted more narrowly, there is 
a possibility that this generates more patents per product/ technology thereby leading to as much 
technological interdependence as patent policies that construe and grant broad patent claims 
(Cohen et al, 2002, p. 1357; Granstrand, 2000).25 This calls for a very sound assessment of 
patent scope issues within every system of innovation. Additionally, solutions such as extended 
disclosure requirements in patent laws and increased pre-grant procedures that have been 
successful in inducing technological spillovers between firms in other sectors should be 
considered (Cohen et al, 2002).  
 
                                                     
25  Cohen et al (2002) note this form of interdependence in the case of the Japanese manufacturing 
sector. They note that such technological interdependence may, in addition to inducing spillovers, 
also stimulate patenting activity: firms derive bargaining power from larger patent portfolios (see 
also, Cohen et al, 2000). 
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